Mitigation,indirection and women's speech: a speech act approach by Henkel, Jacqueline
MITIGATION, INDIRECTION, AND WOMEN'S SPEECH: 
A SPEECH ACT APPROACH 
Jacqueline Henkel 
University of Minnesota 
INTHODUCT ION 
Some of the recent work on women's speech has been concentrated 
on the issue of women's 'linguistic insecurlty'9 that is, on the 
claim that women are generally less assertive, more uncertain and 
hesi.tant in conversation than men are. Such studies usually follow 
the lead of Robin Lakoff's discussion in Language and Women's Place 
(1975), focusing on those indicators of verbal timidity she first 
idcntified--tag questions» hedging expressions like kind of or sort 
of, mitigating phrases like I think or I don't know,--or-indirect ut-
terances like 'You could go homet'Omorr;w' (as opposed to 'I wnnt 
you to go home tomorrow'). If we assume the rough correlation 
Lakoff postulntes between the frequency of such variables and speak-
er insecurity, then the research task is fairly uncomplicated: to 
discover whether or not one speaker or group of speakers is more 
linguistically uncertain than another, we need only record them in 
similar conversational situations and tabulate variables of this 
sort. Certainly this seems to be a reasonable approach; we nntural-
ly feel that someone who says !_ guess or probably more often than 
someone who does not is more conversationally insecure. Or at least 
we suspect that such a speaker will be perceived as weak or unasser-
tive by her interlocutors. 
Surprisingly, however, this has not at all been the attitude 
toward mitigation, hedging, and indirection of speech act theorists 
like John Searle (1979) or Bruce Fraser (1975;1976), or even of so-
ciolinguists who have imported speech act theory into their work--as 
William I.abov does, for instance, in Therapeutic Discourse: Psycho-
therapy as Conversation (1977). Where one logical possibility is to 
stress speaker insecurity as the major implication of mitigating and 
hedging expressions, ordinary language philosophers have tended to 
view them as strategic, as accomplishing practical conversational 
functions. Fraser (1976:1-2) even defines mitigation as hearer di-
rected, as speakers attempts to modulate some more 'basic message' in 
terms of their listeners. In speech act terminology, speakers miti-
gate in an attempt to produce in their hearers a certain 'perlocu-
tionary effect'. A mitigated utterance, Fraser notes (1976:6-8), 
can enable a speaker to make positive--possibly self-serving--con-
versatlonal gains. As she mitigates or hedges, a speaker may in-
crease the probability of the acceptance of her utterance, may there-
by generate cooperation in her audience; she may forestall a hear-
er's negative reaction to unwelcome information--and its unpleasant 
effects on her; and she may even (although, strictly speaking, Fraser 
would not call this mitigation) weaken the commitments she is pres-
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sured to make by hedging her offers and promises. 
We have, then, two competing explanations of mitigation, both 
of which make good intuitive sense: one postulates that speakers 
mitigate when they feel insecure, the other that they merely antici-
pate the effect of their speech actions on others. The purpose of 
this analysis was essentially to solve this problem, the problem of 
how best to characterize mitigating behavior, to decide whether mit-
igated and hedged constructions invariably need be associated with 
weakness, speaker insecurity, perhaps powerlessness, or whether they 
could be described as practical, stategic, possibly even as manipu~ 
lative. The results at least suggest that mitigation is not incon-
sistent with strong, directive speaker action, and that linguistical-
ly insecure speakers may not automatically be identified by the ov-
erall frequency of their use of these variables. 
METHODOLOGY 
To make any claims about mitigation in general--or about the 
function of mitigated and hedged utterances for particular speakers 
in certain conversational situations--it is obviously necessary to 
develop regular criteria by which to distinguish hearer focused mit-
igation from mitigators and hedges that are simple reflexes of a 
speaker's emotional response. Of course, it may be that at some 
level these two characterizations of mitigating behavior are only 
apparently contradictory: perhaps speech acts that are somehow 
speaker sensitive, strategic are so simply because speakers are hes-
itant, are forced to strategize because they are reluctant to offend. 
Yet it should still be possible to differentiate between utterances 
aimed at influencing a speaker's responses and actions (and mitiga-
tion in this context could be associated with some amount of npeaker 
insecurity) and speech acts that imply little speaker investment in 
hearers' reactions--except, of course, in their continued polite at-
tention--where speaker insecurity would be more strongly indicated 
because manipulative intentions could be excluded. 
It was in order to make just these distinctions that the method 
of analysis here was developed from principles central to speech act 
theory. It naturally assumes the much repeated notions that the 
speech act is the basic semantic unit, that what speakers say is to 
be distinguished from what actions they perform on others as they 
speak, and that context and speaker intention are crucial to meaning. 
The conversational analysis thus attempts to identify underlying 
speech actions rather than tabulate surface sentence types. The 
classification and identification of speech acts relies especially 
on Searles streamlined account of indirection and his speech act 
. taxonomy (1979), on Labov and Fanshel's conversational analysis 
(1977), especially on their more extensive discussion of indirection 
and their account of conversational propositions, and on Fraser's 
analysis of the co-occurence possibilites between mitigators, hedges 
and performative verbs (1975). · 
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One problem with this approach, however, is that speech act 
discussions focus on 'performative' utterances, in which verbs 
are said to explicitly announce speaker intention (as in 9 1 hereby 
warn you to get off my propert}"), and speakers rarely characterize 
tlteir speech actions this way in natural conversation. Taxonomies 
of speech acts often end up as lists of performative verbs, and 
hedr,es and mitigators are correlated with verbs assumed to be iden-
tical with the hypothetical speaker's intention. Hy solution is to 
rely on Searle's principles of the 'point' and 'direction of fit' 
of utterances to generally identify speech acts (and ignore the 
prob lett of postulnting an underlying performative verb for each ut-
terance), and to extend Fraser's thinking about the correlation be-
tween hedges and types of verbs to possible correlations between 
mitigating nnd hedging expressions and Searle's broader speech act 
categories. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The data (see Tables III a and b) were collected from a small 
number of female informants (five) of approximately the same age 
(twenty-five to thirty-one years, except for speaker D, who is for-
ty), and of roughly equivalent educational backgrounds (all speakers 
nre in their fourth, fifth~ or sixth year of graduate school in the 
same university department). Each speaker is a member of the same 
loosely defined social group; that is, they meet together regularly 
at lunches and at after-hours social occasions as well as at various 
departmental meetings. Two of the speakers (A and B) were initially 
de[incd as dominant by a number of measures: both have held two or 
more official (elected) positions in departmental organizations or 
on conunittees, both are known as successful, dominant personalities, 
and both are generally thought of by the other graduate students 
with whom they associate as especially verbal (speaker A is of ten 
characterized as forward and verbose, and speaker n's frank asser-
tiveness is a subject of teasing comment). Informants C, D, and E, 
by default, were identified as non-dominant, but also because their 
generally supposed non-aggressiveness is again a topic of discus-
sion.1 Informant Chad once held an official group position but no 
longer does so; speaker E had been elected chair of one departmental 
organization, but her distiictive duties were being gradually assumed 
by speaker A and other group members. 
Conversations were recorded in five different situations: at 
one meeting of a graduate student organization, at two meetings of 
a department women's group, at a supper in one informant's home, and 
at one spontaneous lunch-time gathering. The total conversation 
time transcribed and tabulated was one hour to an hour and twenty 
minutes for each speaker in the official department meetings (de-
fined as formal), and one and one half hours for the social occasions 
(defined as informal). 2 
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In order to eventually correlate mitigating expressions with 
speech act ''types, utterance boundaries were marked on the transcrip-
tions as follows,;3 A main clause and any attached subordinate clauses 
were counted as a single unit, coordinated main clauses as two. The 
only exceptions to this rule were clauses that began with subordina-
tors but which were separated from a previous utterance both by a 
significant pause and a drop in the speaker's intonation pattern. 
Utterances containing broken granunatical constructions were elimin-
ated if the unfinished construction was part of a main clause, but 
counted if only the attached subordinate clauses remained uncoriplet-
ed (mitigating expressions in such clauses, however, were left untab-
ulated). The examples below illustrate: 
1. Well, we can't really solve what's already happened, 
but I think that what we can do is to try to talk to {name) 
(two-units, two mitigating expressions) 
2. Well, um, it's kinda a weird situation, 'cause I think 
that, well it's (trails off). • • • -~~-
(one unit, one mitigating expression) 
3. Send out a little survey that asks for volunteers. 
(lengthy pause) 'Cause some people don't wanna parti-
cipate. 
(two units, no mitigating expressions) 
These utterance units were subsequently classified according to 
adaptation~ of Searle's speech act taxonomy (1979:1-29): 
1. Commissives 
This category includes expressions of commitment--
offers, promises, pledges, and so on. Commissives 
were identified for the sole purpose of eliminating 
them from the final tabulation, since it is impossible 
for mitigators to imply either speaker insecurity or 
hearer sensitivity in this context. Because the point 
of a cornmissive is to obligate the speaker to some fu-
ture action, mitigation here serves only to weaken the 
speaker's own commitment and responsibilities. 
2. A-assertions and 3. D-assertions 
Searle's category is termed 'assertives' and groups 
utterances that express belief about some state of 
affairs, about 'something's being the case' (1979:12). 
Assertives were divided here into two subsets (this on 
the basis of Labov and Fanshel's discussion, 1977:100-
102) that are more revealing for this analysis--into 
A-assertions, expressing something only the speaker 
herself could be said to know about, something in the 
realm of her own private feelings and experiences, and 
D-assertions, disputab~e assertions about matters that 
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ar.e somehow public ground, are available for general 
examination. These categories thus distinguish betweet 
unassai1ahle assertions and those it is possible for 
other speakers to doubtp question, or attack. 
4. Directives 
The directive category includes all speakers' at-
tempts to get hearers to perform some action, as in 
suggestions, commands, demands, or requests of any 
kind. 
5. Requests for information or confirmation4 
Strictly speaking, requests for information are a sub-
set of directives (Labov and Fanshel 1977:88-93), but they 
are directives of a minimal sort; that is 9 they requin::. 
only that the hearer respond, not agree or promise or 
perform some more complicated action. Again this sub-
division distinguishes between speech acts that in-
fringe in 'some way on listeners and those that do not. 
(Examples of speech act types extracted from the transcriptions are 
listed in Table I.) 
Finally, mitigating and hedging expressions--mitigating verbs, 
mitigating adverbials and modals, disclaiming phrases, and certain 
kinds of indirection--were tabulated according to the speech act 
categories (examples from the texts are listed in Table 11).5 Miti-
gating modals are really also cases of indirection: they are liter-
ally about a hearer's ability or desire to perform some action, as 
in 'Could you shut the door1' Included under the category 'indirec-
tion'• then, are other sorts of oblique references 0 usually in direc-
tives, to such things as the possible (positive) consequences of per-
forming some action, the existential status of some object involved 
in the action, or a speaker's responsibility for performing an ac-
tion (see Labov and Fanshel 1977:84-86). Disclaimers were defined 
as phrases that apologize in some way for an assertion or requested 
action (Fraser 1976:12-13). The final results are indicated in Ta-
ble III (separate tabulations are shown for the transcriptions of 
formal and informal conversations). 
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TABLE I: 
Examples in Speech Act Categories 
1. Commissives 
--Bob, do you want me to get a fork? 
--Well, I'll volunteer to have it in three weeks, say, at my a-
partment--or two--three weeks. 
2. A-assertions 
--And--1--you know--I'm real unhappy with what ends up happening. 
--I've never read Riffaterre, 'cause I orily--don't read the stuff 
on poetry. 
3. D-assertions 
--It's sorta like they can do anything that someone doesn't stop 
them from doing. 
--I didn't think they did a good enough job with it--though, 
you know, it was a good idea--like .the stuff--stuff with the 
modern •• 
4. Directives 
--Well, how 'bout something like if Compac wrote up some kinda 
memo to people who are planning to do composition research in-
volving TA's in the future and asking them to--would they 
please take these things into consideration. 
--Well maybe just, you know, for the future, which is all we can 
really talk about, is, perhaps, first of all, write a little 
note from Compac to everyone. 
5. Requests for information E£ confirmation 
--What administrative things could you eliminate for the comp. 
ieachers other than participating in this study? 
--Doctor Bill Loan--so he's done the same thing in other states. 
TABLE I: 
Examples of Mitigating and Hedging Expressions 
l. Mitigating verbs 
--But I don't think Delta Dental has its own dentists. 
--I guess my need is just for more contact. 
2. Hedges (adverbials) 
--Well, ah, something like this could probably help--sense of 
regularity if we have regular meetings. 
--For one thing, I don't know, I kinda feel that he's not being 
honest. ~~-
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3. Mitigating rnodals 
--I would think she knows already. 
--We could talk to {name} and we could ask her to write a 
memo. 
4. Indirection 
--It might be worthwhile asking them to say--ah--either with a 
memo or hold a meeting for all comp. teachers. 
--_!!. might be nice if they not only mitigated but explained why 
it's important. 
5. Disclaimers 
--Well like maybe, if it's at all possible, to ask like--! would 
maybe--not to exchange papers .P.!:!.~· but I would like to see 
if we have proposals for something. 
--These mounds builders ~whatever they ~ are a big thing in 
Ohio. 
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METHODOLOGICAL RESULTS 
In some respects the analysis proved how well suited the in-
sights of speech act theory are for theoretical discussions in which 
postulated speaker intentions and contextual conditions can be spec-
ified for the sake of a particular argument, and how little suited 
in some ways these same insights are for application to natural, 
spontaneous conversations, where the complications of a social con-
text involving several speakers with a long history of regular inter-
action suggest a wider range of interpretive possibilities for each 
utterance. Conversation among such speakers is multi-layered; it in-
volves a number of shared, assumed propositions, against which speech 
acts are interpreted. As Labov and Fanshel describe the problem, 
social familiars respond to one another at 'many levels of abstrac-
tion', and their utterances are bound together by 'a web of under-
standings and reactions' (1977:30). It is thus not surprising that 
the classification of utterance types proved to be more problematic 
than anticipated, even given the speech act framework. 
It became obviously necessary, as the analysis progressed, to 
'put a ceiling' on possible levels of interpretation, to develop 
more explicit and specific procedures for determining categories of 
speech acts. As a general rule, it seemed most appropriate to limit 
the information applied in interpretation to the immediate verbal 
and social context. This would allow for such considerations as a 
speaker's response to the understood goals of the conversation, to 
what other speakers have just said, and would take account of a 
speaker's knowledge of the social positions of her various inter-
locutors, of what most speakers would recognize as their social 
rights and responsibilites; yet it would exclude such things as poss-
ible references to past events (when nothing in the verbal context 
suggests it), or to certain general shared propositions (Labov and 
Fanshel: 1977:51-58) such as 'person X is too aggressive' or 'per-
son Y sympathizes too often with senior faculty on department is-·· 
sues•. 6 This general principle generated these procedural rules: 
1. Requests for information are scrutinized for possible 
interpretation as directives, since directives often 
take this surface form, but only in the context of some 
immediate goal. Thus the literal request 'Do you think 
we should get X to write a new memo?' is counted as a 
directive, a suggestion, in the context of a discussion 
of possible group action, but not as an assertive of 
some sort, as it may be on a more abstract level (a-
bout X's incompetence, for example, given a situation 
in which X's past failures have been much discussed). 
2. Apparent statements of commitment are examined for 
likely interpretation as D-assertions or directives. 
'Do you want me to see if I can find a comb?', for in-
stance, a surface request for information, is easily 
interpreted as an offer, a commissive. But in the · 
context of a situation in which the hearer's hair is 
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obviously out of place, it may be interpreted as a dir-
ective (aimed simply at getting the listener to fix 
her hair). Once aga:ln, however, it may not be counted 
as a higher-level assertive ~rhaps as about this per~ 
son's usually unkempt appearance). 
3. A-assertlons are interpreted very narrowlyo on the as·· 
sumption that speakers of ten attempt to characterize 
0-assertions as statements about private feelings or 
belief in order to facilitate their interlocutors' 
acceptance of them. (Compare 'I reel sick' to 'I 
thought the movie was bad'.) 
With these additional guidelines, then, I was finally able to 
limit the interpretive possibilites and classify speech act types 
with some consistency. 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
An import~nt first conclusion to be drawn from the data (see 
Table III) is that the informants--at least in formal contexts--did 
not mitigate in some general way, but in order to accomplish specif-
ic conversational goals. The mitigated and hedged constructions 
were very much audience directed and seemed, in fact. to work ac-
cording to some basic principle of conversational economy. That is, 
speech acts that required most of a speaker's interlocutors were 
most heavily hedged and mitigated; those that demanded least of the 
hearer were less frequently modulated in these ways.7 Thus all the 
informants (Table III-a) mitigated most frequently when they were 
suggesting the hearer perform an action--consent to some group ac-
tivity or participate in some task--and next most of ten when they 
were making assertions open to dispute--and so implicitly appealing 
to their listeners for agreement and belief. Requests for information 
(which ask another speaker merely to respond, to say something) and 
A-assertions (which simply require someone else's attention) were in 
all cases mitigated least. 
If the principle of 'economy' is correct, we would expect this 
pattern to be repeated, only at lower levels, in casual conversation 
where familiarity would enable speakers to assert and rEtJt.est more 
freely. And the distribution of hedges and mitigators by kinds of 
speech acts in Table lll-b does essentially duplicate that in the 
first table, with the exception that percentages of mitigated di-
rectives fall to a new low (at least this is true for speaker A).8 
Of course, the raw number of directives itself drops and so the data 
here are rather unrevealing; when people speak informally they have 
no defined group task to accomplish, and they consequently produce 
fewer requests, orders, suggestions, bits of advice. But nlso--
and this would explain the problem even if further data were still 
to indicate small percentages of mitigated directives in informal 
contexts--the actions that are likely to be proposed in casual sit-
uations are of a minimal sort, requiring little mitigation because, 
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TABLES Ill g AND Ill b: 
Mit'igations and Hedges Tabulated by Speech Act Categories 
Formal Contexts 
Speech Acts 
/J. .nn-~ ... t- n_n_n~ ..... n-1 .. ~-1- o,,.,. -Tnfn TOT AT 
(4/52) (40/90) (22/23) (0/9) (66/ 174) 
A 7.1% 44.4% 95. n: 0% 38% 
(0/10) (26/65) (8/8) (0/10) (34/93) 
B 
07. 40% 100% 0% 36.6% 
(1/3) (2/21) (0/2) (1/2) (4/28) 
xx 9.5% xx xx ll1. 3% 
(3/20) ( 10/21) (7/6) (0/5) (20/52) 
D 
15% 47.6% 100%+ 0% 38.4% 
(5/14) (13/42) (15/ l 7) (0/2) (33/73) 
E 35.7% 40% 88.2% 0% 45.2% 
Informal Contexts 
Speech Acts 
· A-assert. D-assert. Direct. Rea.-Info. TOTAL 
(6/104) (13/68) (0/7) (0/12) (18/191) 
A 5.8% 19.1% 0% 0% 9.4% 
(l/13) (7/27) (O/l) (2/24) (10/64) 
7.8% 25.9% xx 8.3% 15.6% B 
(13/73) (18/83) (2/7) (0/ 13) (33/ 176) 
17.8% 21. 7"I. 28.6% 0% 18.8% 
(6/35) (10/26) (0/0) (0/9) ( 16/70) 
17.1% 38.5% xx 0% 22.9% D 
(0/38) (0/9) (0/3) (0/4) (0/511) 
0% 0% xx xx 0% E 
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once again, they demand little of the hearer. Directives like 'Get 
me a cup of coffee too' or 'Here, take this dollar' are frequent in 
ioformnl settings. It would seem reasonable, then, to coninue to 
predict mitigation by noting first how much 'hearer work' a particu-
lar utterance demands, especially since D-assertions consistently fi~ 
the pattern. 
A second central point is that there is evidence here that mlt-· 
igating behavior is not at all incompatible with aggressiveness and 
verbal dominance. If speakers were hesitant and insecure, we would 
expect speech act categories to register a more even distribution of 
hedges and mitigators, and we would expect A-assertions especially 
to reflect speakers' conversational insecurity; would not hesitant 
speakers mitigate in asserting feelings or in relating experiences 
as well as in proposing actions for others? Yet this is generally 
not the case, although speakers D and E tend to mitigate more in 
this environment than other speakers. At any rate, they are the in-
formants other speakers do characterize as insecure. And further, 
since speaker D's expressed wish at one of the formal meetings was 
to use the group gatherings as a place to explore personal feelings, 
she was more concerned with representing the nuances of her personal 
reactions than were other speakers. (Her age may also account for 
some difference here.) 
The most striking indication, however, that informants 
who mitigate heavily are not necessarily insecure is that speakers 
A and 8, who have already been identified as the most dominant in-
formants in the group, mitigate as much as (or more than) the other 
speakers in formal contexts. And certainly these informants could 
be described as 'controlling' speakers in at least two additional 
respects: speaker A regularly controlled the floor for longer than 
other speakers (and this applied in both casual and formal contexts); 
and both, in the official meetings, were usually able to produce a 
greater number of utterances in a given period of time than the oth-
ers. This was especially true at the start of formal group meetings 
where speakers A and B characteristically took the initiative by an-
nouncing the start of official business, defining the purpose of the 
meeting, or identifying group issues--even in cases where they were 
not required by any official position to do so. Thus in the first 
thirty minutes of one meeting speaker A produced eighty utterances, 
speaker B twenty-seven, and speakers C and D seven and none respec-
tively. In the first thirty minutes of n second meeting (a more e-
galitarian one since no officials had yet been elected, and since the 
gathering was defined as one in which everyone could--and should--
air their grievances) speaker A was still able to dominate with fif-
ty-seven utterance units, while the tabulations for the other in-
formants were twenty-two (spe~ker B), five (speaker C), twenty-two 
(speaker D), and twenty (for E).9 
It is interesting that it was this initiating, group defining 
behavior that was most mitigated (rates of mitigation fell notice-
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ably as meetings progessed). B's remarks at one meeting illustrate; 
her speech is marked by mitigations, hedges, and hesitations: 
Right. Somebody should--we're not gonna really have that 
much for minutes. We're just gonna decide about--! don't 
really think we need--! don't really think we need to do 
minutes, since what we decide will be our minutes. Do you 
wanna--should we--do you wanna know what Lname] and [name] 
said first? They want the number of sections--thirty. 
And they're really--that's •• 
All this suggests that not only is mitigation not necessarily 
to be associated with weak, powerless speakers, but that it may~ in 
fact, be a kind of tradeoff for power, a way of appearing to be less 
directive, perhaps, or a way of directing others while also sig-
nalling a willingness to give way at some point. Mitigation may in-
dicate in some contexts, therefore, not so much a reduction of commit-
ment to one's own suggestions and assertions, as a desire to facil-
itate conversational interaction, to allow others to make contradic-
tory propositions more easily. It is worth noting in this regard 
that the graduate students at these meetings are particularly sen-
sitive to the language in which senior faculty members attempt to 
direct their actions. (The students are in a peculiar 'in between' 
political position in the department that they resent; they teach 
almost as much as senior faculty but have little power or authority.) 
Of ten a meeting involves explicit discussion of the wording of the 
messages senior faculty members aim at graduate students. as in this 
excerpt where a student discusses a professor's 'improper' request: 
Well also 0 she sent that memo, and maybe if it had been 
phrased like it was for--like 'I know this is an incon-
venience, but if you could help me I would greatly apprec-
iate it--it would make my research much more valid'--1 
think maybe people wouldn't have this feeling like 'I'm 
being put upon and nobody asked me if I would do this 
and yet here I am.•10 
It is not unlikely that this sensitivity carries over into other 
p(j'.'li,ons of the formal meetings, and that these speakers are care-
ful not to trigger in their fellow students the kind of resentment 
they themselves feel toward faculty members. 
And this may help explain, too, a final feature of the data, 
the extreme style shifting between formal and informal contexts. 
Once again the dominant speakers (A and B) equal or exceed the oth-
ers in the percent increase in mitigation between casual and care-
ful speaking styles (compare III-a and III-b). This stylistic dif-
ference is such as to be noticeable on some level to at least some 
other speakers. Informant C, for example, who is the lone excep-
tion to thJs upward shift, w.:is unusually resentful of speaker A: 
'Oh that [name] just drives me crazy at those meetings. Even her 
voice--her whole manner changes'. Although the informant was nn-
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able to describe precisely what irritated her (she referred general-
ly to A's 'voice' and 'manner'), she focused on A's verbal behavior, 
and was probably responding to the sudden increase of mitigating 
expressions in the dominant speaker's more careful conversation. 
Her implication is that these 'changes' merely veil A's wish to di-
rect and dominate. (Speaker C's own speech behavior is remarkably 
consistent with her attitude, since she doesn't herself shift styles 
for the purpose of the group meetings.) At any rate~ whether or not 
this speaker's marked change in style is perceived by her interloc-
utors, and whether such changes in speaking styles are resented or 
appreci.ated, again mitigators and hedges seem to be connected to 
dominating, controlling speaker activity. 
Even though it cannot capture all the nuances of a speaker's 
use of mitigating expressions in natural conversation» the speech 
act framework proves to be an adequate and accurate predictor of 
where such expressions will occur. Although it was postulated at 
the start that speaker insecurity of some kind is still a possible--
though less likely--interpretation of mitigated forms appearing in 
D-assertions and directives, this does not seem to be a strong pos-
sible association here, especially for the two dominant speakers, 
whose levels of mitigation increase just when they are most force-
fully directing others' actions. This is not to say, of course, 
that mitigators and hedges never indicate speaker uncertainty or 
hesitation: certainly this is their implication in A-assertions 
and for speakers who register a more even distribution of hedged 
and mitigated expressions across types of speech acts (as speakers 
D and F., perhaps, in this case). Contrary to what we might have 
believed, then, about mitigated utterances, they are not always 
slmple betrayals of a speaker's conversational nervousness or in-
security. And, contrary to what we might have believed about 
mitigating speakers, they are not so likely to be merely uncertain 
as strategic and sensitive to the effects of their speech on 
others. 
NOTES 
1Much discussion in this department surrounds the issue of 
students who are said to be intelligent and deserving, but who 
are passed over for favors (extra courses, and so on) because 
they are too reticent to be noticed by senior faculty members. 
2rhe raw number of utterances seems low .for this amount of 
conversation time, but the hour to an hour and a half refers to 
to the time informants were present at conversational events, not 
the total time each informant was actually speaking. And other 
speakers were present who of course sometimes took the floor from 
informants. 
3this is a somewhat arbitrary association of underlying speech 
actions with main clauses, but it is a practical way to limit the 
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number of s,peech acts postulated. 
4Requests for confirmation are surface statanents heard as re-
quests for information because they refer to events only the list-
ener has access to (Labov and Fanshel 1977:100-101). 
5These expressions were originally tabulated according to var-
ious syntactic positions, but no significant patterns emerged. 
Verbs as higher predicates (I think that) i.«'e included in the count 
with I think tags, because even though such constructions seem to ex-
press-less uncertainty, they are rather ambiguous on the matter of 
speaker commitment (this may be their advantage). 
6see Labov and Fanshd.'s discussion of various background prop-
ositions (Labov and Fanshel 1977:51-58). I've made a slightly dif-
ferent distinc:tion between these and the immediate context. 
7nrown and Levinson develop a similar principle (in a more 
complicated discussion) to explain various kinds of politeness 
phenomena (1978:60-96). 
Bspeaker E is something of an exception (there is no 'distri-
bution' to speak of for her in informal contexts, even though she 
mitigates most in formal ones). But this is because most of her re-
marks were assertions in narrative sequences, and these are infre-
quently mitigated. 
91 1m not certain why speaker n is reticent here. 
10 She essentially complains that a memo wasn't mitigated enough. 
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